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UCLA
Department of Economics |
Placement Directors:
Placement Coordinator: |
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DEGREES |
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2004 |
C. Phil., Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (Ph.D. expected 2007) |
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2005 |
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1999 |
M.A., Macroeconomics, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago de Chile |
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1995 |
B.A., Economics, Universidad del Pacífico, Lima-Perú |
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AWARDS |
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2003-2006 |
Department of Economics, UCLA, Teaching Assistant Position |
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2002-2004 |
Fulbright Scholarship |
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2002 |
Winner (joint with Hugo Ñopo) Research Contest in Social Policies, Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social, Perú |
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1999 |
Academic Distinction (Second Best Student of Graduating Class) |
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1997-1998 |
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1997 |
Friedrich Ebert Foundation Research Grant (joint with Jorge Aguero) |
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DISSERTATION |
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Title |
Essays on Economics and Law Enforcement |
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Chairperson |
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Completion Date |
June 2007 (expected) |
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Job Market Paper: Aggregate Effects of Imperfect Tax Enforcement |
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In this paper I study an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance among operating firms and compare it to a similar one where perfect enforcement is attainable. I develop a competitive general equilibrium model in which imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate outcomes through two mechanisms. First, it may distort firms' optimal output level as long as the chances to succeed in avoiding tax compliance are related to firm's size. Second, poor tax enforcement may lead to low provision of public goods that complement firms' productivity. The results for a calibrated version of the model suggest that in economies with tax enforcement problems aggregate output might be reduced by 12%. I also conclude that sizeable aggregate effects can be obtained only when the public goods mechanism is at work. |
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Fields (research and teaching): |
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Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics, Development Economics, Financial Economics, Industrial Organization |
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY |
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Teaching Experience: |
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2006-summer |
Lecturer, University of California Los Angeles UCLA (Macroeconomics) |
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2003-2006 |
Teaching Assistant, University of California Los Angeles UCLA |
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2005-August |
Visiting Lecturer, Universidad de Piura - Perú (Microeconomics, Finance) |
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2001-2002 |
Lecturer, Microeconomics, Universidad del Pacífico - Perú |
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2000-2001 |
Lecturer, Macroeconomics, Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas - Perú |
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1999 |
Assistant Professor, Universidad de Talca - Chile (Macroeconomics and Finance) |
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1998 |
Teaching Assistant, Econometrics, Universidad Católica de Chile |
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Professional Experience: |
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2005-2006 |
Economist Consultant, PERCAN Project, Perú |
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2000-2002 |
Associate Researcher,
GRADE - Grupo de Análisis para el
Desarrollo, Lima-Perú |
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2003 summer |
Research Assistant, Prof. Duncan Thomas, UCLA, Department of Economics |
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1999 |
Research Assistant, Lead Economist Norman Loayza, World Bank - Central Bank of Chile |
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1998 |
Research Assistant, Prof. Francisco Rosende, Universidad Católica de Chile |
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1995-1996 |
Research Assistant, GRADE - Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo, Lima-Perú |
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PUBLICATIONS |
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"An Impact Evaluation of the Youth Labor Training Program ProJoven". (In Spanish), with Hugo Ñopo and Jaime Saavedra. Documento de Trabajo #36. Lima: GRADE, 2002. |
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Estrategias y Racionalidad de la Pequeña Empresa. (with J. Saavedra, M. Torero, N. Valdivia and J. Chacaltana) International Labor Organization (ILO).537 pp. 2001. |
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"Labor Decisions in Peruvian Rural Economies". (In Spanish), with M. Valdivia. Notas para el Debate No. 11, GRADE. Lima, August 1997. |
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OTHER |
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Peruvian and Chilean citizenship |
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REFERENCES |
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Hugo Hopenhayn} [chair] Professor |
Professor |
Assistant Professor |
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Participation in Research Projects and Consultancy (2000 - Present)
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